# Liberty NC:

## Framework:

#### Morality requires respecting humanity as an end in itself: First, it is a requirement of prescriptive thought that one reflect upon ends to decide; otherwise one’s action would be determined by causal influences. Morality presupposes independent subjects. Humanity is the condition of moral force of particulars like friendship. ENGSTROM:

“Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge,” (article form) Stephen Engstrom [Prof. at University of Pittsburgh

In addition to the idea of universal legislation as the form of practical cognition, there’s a related idea guiding Kant’s thinking about the constraints of pure practical reason that needs to be borne in mind when we consider how they apply in choice and action. **Since** the exercise of **practical reason proceeds from** the **universal to** the **particular,** the application of the formula of **universal law should proceed** in this direction **as well.** Thus **in attempting to determine** what **obligations to other persons** this principle of universality might support, **we should** first **consider** its application in the most primitive, or **fundamental[s],** exercise of the will, andto do thiswe will need to consider the most basic practical self-conception of a particular human person.11 **It would be inappropriate**, for example, **to** begin with duties that **presuppose** particular **relations** between the persons involved, **such as** the ties **between** citizens, family members, or **friends. Such obligations,** important though they are, **depend upon** specific, **contingent conditions of action**, whereas **the cases we** should **consider first are** those of **duties that attach to us** most fundamentally, **merely in virtue of our standing as** human persons, or **subjects with wills,** sharing the power of practical reason**.**

#### And practical identity – like parent, teacher, or debater – require valuing our human identity first. KORSGAARD:

Korsgaard, Christine M. *The Sources of Normativity.* THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES*,* Delivered atClare Hall, Cambridge University*.* November 16 and 17, 1992. Pg. 81-85.

*The Solution:* Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a *conception* of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is *like* to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is *for you* when you deliberate. **When you deliberate, it is as if there were something** over and **above** all of **your desires,** something **that is *you,* and** that ***chooses* which desire to act on**. This means that **the principle** or law by **which you determine your actions is one** that you regard as being **expressive of *yourself.*** To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. **The conception of** one’s **identity in** question here **is** not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as **a description under which you value yourself,** a description **under which you find your life** to be **worth living and** your **actions** to be **worth undertaking**. So I will call this a conception of **your practical identity.** Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on.And **all** of these **identities give rise to** reasons and **obligations. Your reasons express your identity**, your nature; **your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.**

#### To attach value to any identity means you must value yourself as someone who needs reasons to act and live. You can shed every identity except your human identity; we can shed conflicting impulses by choosing not to take them as reasons, but you cannot have reason to reject the value of the source of your moral reasons.

#### Second, if an agent regards their purpose as important, they must regard the means as important, one of which is freedom. To deny that freedom is important would deny the purpose was important. An agent must view themselves as having a right to freedom since one condition of freedom is that other agents do not violate your freedom. If one willed the right to freedom existed only under certain conditions, lacking those conditions would mean lacking the right to freedom but any purposive agent must view themselves as having freedom; any restrictive condition on people’s freedom is incoherent. Being an agent generates these rights rather than a particular agent.

#### One can never restrict the ends a subject can set as their means, because to be human is to autonomously set the ends. To treat humanity as an end requires one to respect the legislative right of agents to use their means as they see fit free of domination. RIPSTEIN:

Arthur Ripstein. “Beyond the Harm Principle.” University of Toronto. http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Ripstein/beyond\_harm\_principle.pdf.

**You are independent if you** are the one who **decide**s **what ends you** will **use your powers to pursue**, as opposed to having someone else decide for you. You may still mess up, decide badly, or betray your true self. You may have limited options. You remain independent if nobody else gets to tell you what to do. Each of us is independent if neither of us gets to tell the other what to do. **This** interest in independence is not a special case of a more general interest in being able to set and pursue your purposes. Instead, it **is a distinctive aspect of your status as a person**, entitled to set your own purposes, and **not required to act as an instrument for the pursuit of anyone else’s** purposes. **You are sovereign because nobody else gets to tell you what to do; you would be their subject if they did.** Once freedom is understood in terms of people’s respective independence, one person’s freedom doesn’t conflict with another’s. **Each person is free to use** his or **her own powers to set and pursue** his or **her own purposes, consistent with the freedom of others to** use their powers to **set their purposes.** A system of equal freedom demands that nobody use their own powers in a way that will deprive another of theirs, or uses another person’s powers without their permission.

#### The standard is respecting liberty. Impact calc:

#### a) Irrespective of a gun’s goodness there are no grounds to legislatively require it. It is immoral not to give to charity, but that does not mean I can steal your income and donate it for you. You cannot subject another’s means even to good ends, just as slavery is no less repugnant if one sets their slaves to humanitarian projects.

#### b) Since intention is the act of the will, only contradictions inherent to the state’s intention generate contradictions with the necessary aim of the will. Consequences that commonly go along with gun bans are not part of what the state wills, since the state doesn’t need to take these to justify action any time they take it, so foreseen effects are always outweighed by inherent ones

#### c) Freedom is the ultimate good but isn’t something we have to maximize since a) every action’s infinitely divisible so there’s an infinite amount anyway and b) there is no logical contradiction when we don’t maximize freedom but only when one violates

## Offense:

#### A prohibition on any guns interferes with one’s liberty to act as they please.

Huemer 03’ Michael Heumer. “Social Theory and Practice: Is There a Right to Own a Gun” Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 2003), pp. 297-324. Reprinted by permission of Social Theory and Practice. http://www.owl232.net/guncontrol.htm/LHPsNK 12/2/15

Second, and more plausibly: one might claim that the value of the lives that could be saved by anti-gun laws is simply much greater than the recreational value of firearms. It is not obvious that this is correct, even if gun control would significantly reduce annual gun-related deaths. Many gun owners appear to derive enormous satisfaction from the recreational use of firearms, and it is no exaggeration to say that for many, recreational shooting is a way of life. Footnote Furthermore, there are a great many gun owners. At a rough estimate, the number of gun owners is two thousand times greater than the number of annual firearms-related deaths. Footnote Even if we assume optimistically that a substantial proportion [306] of recreational gun users could and would substitute other forms of recreation, we should conclude that the net utility of gun control legislation is greatly overestimated by those who discount the recreational value of guns. For obvious reasons, the utility resulting from recreational use of firearms is not easy to quantify, nor to compare with the value of the lives lost to firearms violence. Yet this is no reason for ignoring the former, as partisans in the gun control debate often do. But our present concern is not chiefly utilitarian. The argument here is that gun enthusiasts’ prima facie right to own guns is significant in virtue of the central place that such ownership plays in their chosen lifestyle. A prohibition on firearms ownership would constitute a major interference in their plans for their own lives. On the criteria given in §2.3, this suffices to show that such a prohibition would be a serious rights-violation.

#### A state cannot restrict an individual’s ends even if it maximizes the end-setting of another. RIPSTEIN 2:

Arthur Ripstein. “Beyond the Harm Principle.” University of Toronto. http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Ripstein/beyond\_harm\_principle.pdf.

The fact thatthedespotsin questionact through an elected legislature doesn’t solve the problem. It just serves as a reminder, in case anyone needed one, that legislatures are despotic if they advance private purposes rather than public ones. That possibility isn’t limited to paternalism: [A]ny criminal prohibition that doesn’t protect sovereignty is a despotic violation of it. Your **neighbour cannot decide** which **ends you** may **pursue; nor can the majority** of your neighbours, **acting through the state.** As a special case of this, they can’t act through the state **to prohibit you from doing something that isn’t objectionable as a means of preventing you, or someone else, from doing something that is.** That is liberalism’s core insight: **Against the private choices of others, the individual’s sovereignty is**, as Mill says, **absolute**.

# AT Aff Turns:

## AT Hindering a Hindrance:

### OV:

#### 1. The NC framework says nothing of the obligation of the state – it just says individuals liberty shouldn’t be violated whatsoever – takes out your arg since hindering a hindrance requires the state to intervene to prevent future violations

### Line by Line:

#### 1. They say in a state of nature, you don’t know if others will respect your freedom. But this just means there’s a risk others will violate your freedom. This is not itself a violation of freedom.

#### 2. Even if both parties must accept the authority of a third party with power over both of them, since even if people were perfectly nice and good, the state of nature would still violate freedom because it lacks a structural guarantee. But for this very reason, they fail to end the state of nature. There’s still no third party with authority over both the citizens and the government.

#### 3. It doesn’t make sense to justify hindering hindrances. Kolodny

Ripstein would deny that force used to achieve an equal distribution violates independence at all. But one might say, instead, that while such force does indeed [to] infringe the aggressor’s interest in controlling others’ uses of force against him, **this is justified on distributive grounds**: it furthers the victim’s like interest, and the victim would otherwise be “worse off” in the relevant respect. **When is “independence” equal? When people are free from the same “amount” of actual nonconsensual force?** But **that’s crazy.** Take punishment. **Suppose I have hit you**. **If I am hit back, then the distribution of batteries is equalized. But this is not just “leveling down,” but leveling down that doesn’t obviously deliver a more equal result.**

#### 4. Hindering a hindrance of freedom requires an external account of freedom that someone is legitimately entitled to, which means we can’t just define it as outer freedom. Valentini[[1]](#footnote-1)

As **Ripstein puts it, a system where all have freedom as independence ‘is one in which each person is free to use his or her powers, individually or cooperatively, to set his or her own purposes, and no one is allowed to compel others to use their powers in a way designed to advance or accommodate any other person’s purposes’**. But how are we to determine what one’s powers and purposes are? **Certainly not by looking at their actual powers and purposes.** To be sure, **when policemen stop a thief**, they prevent him from using his (positive, as opposed to normative) powers for his (positive) purposes, yet thief’s right to freedom. **This is** paradigmatically **a legitimate intervention [is], aimed at ‘hindering a hindrance to freedom’** (i.e., the freedom of the victim, whose means would serve someone else’s, the thief’s, purposes). **The freedom** referred to in the expression ‘hindering a hindrance to freedom’ cannot be any freedom, but **must be the freedom one is entitled to on grounds of justice. Until we have an independent account of justice, then, we cannot know whether someone is free or unfree. Unless we know what is ours, we cannot know whether constraints** on our de facto agency **are violations of our independence** or consistent with it.

## AT Monopoly of Force:

#### 1. This requires that they prove that handguns can be a unilateral force that can resist the state but that makes no sense since handguns can’t beat nukes/other weapons the state has.

#### 2. They haven’t proven that the intent of a handgun is force – our arg is that a handgun is a key tool of self defense and private property, which outweighs b/c of Ripstein 2

#### 3. This requires a justification of the state – the NC framework doesn’t go that far so if they don’t justify that conclusion the impact doesn’t matter

#### 4. The #1 impact calc takes this out – even if gun control is good you can’t subject the means of people to the end of the state – a legitimate state under the NC is only one that is libertarian, which means I outweigh.

## AT Property Bad:

#### 1. The NC doesn’t say absolute property is good – it just says that violations of freedom are bad – in this instance, the freedom to possess a gun

#### 2. Impact turn – property rights are good/key:

#### A. Property rights establishes the boundaries between the ethical and the prohibited, superseding the substance of what we prohibit. Anderson[[2]](#footnote-2)

**Property is established by moral commands issued as "thou shalt nots" that establish boundaries. Our "property" is the space into which we may deny others entry and in which we may judge and prohibit their actions. It is the space in which we have control. The invocation of the negative-our decision to tell others that** they may not enter or that **they may not act in certain ways** within our territory-**is the capacity that creates us as ethical beings who can and must decide what is** fitting or **proper** in our space (a measure of "propriety"). **And** the [**this**] **"no"** that establishes propriety **also determines the nature**-the characteristics-**of that space: how one shapes one's property**-what one lets in- **determines one's** [**obligations**] properties.For Burke **identity is a function of** both **property** and propriety, of both control **and ethical choice.**

#### B. The process of denying property rights in a round implies its truth. Ostrowski on Hoppe[[3]](#footnote-3)

"[A]rgumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting ... a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation." 112 Hoppe summarizes the complete argument as follows: Whenever a person claims that some statement can be justified, [s]he at least implicitly assumes the following norm to be justified: "Nobody has the right to uninvitedly aggress against the body of any other person and thus delimit or restrict anyone's control over [her] his own body." This rule is implied in the concept of justification as argumentative justification. Justifying means justifying without having to rely on coercion. In fact, if one formulates the opposite of this rule, i.e., "everybody has the right to uninvitedly aggress against other people" . . . then it is easy to see that this rule is not, and never could be, defended in argumentation. To do so would in fact have to presuppose the validity of precisely its opposite, i.e., the aforementioned principle of non-aggression.

#### A rejection of this argument is to reject the principle of argumentation itself, making a debate round itself pointless because there’d be no reason to debate itself.

#### C. Self-determination is key to generating any moral claim; its impossible to claim any agent “ought” to do anything unless they have the ability to use the relevant means to pursue those ends – therefore any claim that denies that individuals a have right to property makes morality self-defeating. If one doesn’t have self-determination, then any ethical action can be justified because morality itself is incoherent.

#### D. Property is the foundation of all other rights claims as they ground the ability for an individuals to be wronged, i.e. it only makes sense for an individual to claim that they right to assembly has been violated, if they also make an implicit claim that they ought to have the freedom use their bodies and ends in a particular way.

# Kant Solves Oppression:

#### The counter role of the ballot is to vote for the better post-fiat advocacy that is most consistent with Kantian principles as outlined by the NC framework.

#### 1. The intent-foresight distinction is key to making debate a safe space. ANSCOMBE[[4]](#footnote-4)

It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy. For there are always borderline cases in ethics. Now if you are either an Aristotelian, or a believer in divine law, you will deal with a borderline case by considering whether doing such-and-such in such-and-such circumstances is, say, murder, or is an act of injustice; and according as you decide it is or it isn't, you judge it to be a thing to do or not. This would be the method of casuistry; and while it may lead you to stretch a point on the circumference, it will not permit you to destroy the centre. But if you are a consequentialist, the question "What is it right to do in such-and-such circumstances?" is a stupid one to raise. The casuist raises such a question only to ask "Would it be permissible to do so-and-so?" or "Would it be permissible not to do so-and-so?" Only if it would not be permissible not to do so-and-so could he say "This would be the thing to do.” Otherwise, though he may speak against some action, he cannot prescribe any- for in an actual case, the circumstances (beyond the ones imagined) might suggest all sorts of possibilities, and you can't know in advance what the possibilities are going to be. Now **the consequentialist has no footing on which to say "This would be permissible, this not"; because by his own hypothesis, it is the consequences that are to decide, and he has no business to pretend that he can lay it down what possible twists a man could give doing this or that**; the most he can say is: a man must not bring about this or that; he has no right to say he will, in an actual case, bring about such-and-such unless he does so-and-so. Further, the consequentialist, in order to be imagining borderline cases at all, has of course to assume some sort of law or standard according to which this is a borderline case, Where then does he get the standard from? In practice the answer invariably is: from the standards current in his society or his circle. And it has in fact been the mark of all these philosophers that they have been extremely conventional; they have nothing in them by which to revolt against the conventional standards of their sort of people; it is impossible that they should be profound. But the chance that a whole range of conventional standards will be decent is small. Finally, the point of considering hypothetical situations, perhaps very improbable ones, seems to be to elicit from yourself or someone else a hypothetical decision to do something of a bad kind. I don't doubt this has the effect of predisposing people-who will never get into the situations for which they have made hypothetical choices-to consent to similar bad actions, or to praise and flatter those who do them, so long as their crowd does so too, when the desperate circumstances imagined don't hold at all.

#### Anscombe shows that rights are incompatible with consequentialism. But rights are key tools of empowerment for disadvantaged groups. LEWIS[[5]](#footnote-5)

**The language of rights has been a key tool of empowerment for** many **disadvantaged groups including** people of color, **wom[x]n, and the wom[x]n of color** who intersect both groups(Steiner 1996; P. Williams 1987; Schneider 1986; Crenshaw 1993; Sparer 1984; Harris 1994). As part of a larger strategy **leaders of minority** ethnic **groups** in the United States **have based** their **appeals for** social **justice on rights concepts** and have appealed to international institutions to assist in publicizing or supporting their struggles. Both W.E.B. DuBois and Malcolm X hoped to present violations of the human rights of African-Americans before the United Nationas (Maloclm X 1970; Dudziak 1988; Lockwood 1984; Thomas 1996). The indigenous peoples and nations of the Americas have looked to the international human rights system as an alternative means of redressing harms not adequately dressed under domestic law and policy (R. Williams 1990; Tennant 1994).

#### 2. Abstraction is key to stopping oppression. Wood[[6]](#footnote-6):

There is no plausibility at all, for example, in the suggestion that such Kantian **principles as** human **equality**, rationalism, **universalism**, and cosmopolitanism **are [not]** in their content **favorable to** racism, sexism, or other forms of **oppression**, and such a thesis needs only to be stated explicitly to discredit itself. But this highly implausible thesis may be put forward by implication if it can be associated with the quite distinct but correct point that *even* a cosmopolitan and universalistic ethical theory, such as Kant’s, can be combined with racist or male-supremacist views in its application. It is also true that **[these principles]** egalitarianism, rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism **are** especially **liable to rhetorical** **abuse** by those who advocate policies in direct violation of them, because subscribing to the correct principles at an abstract level is often enough a shabby ploy used to protect contrary policies from criticism. **The thought that this** point **has any** *philosophical***significance**, however, **rests on an error** of abysmal proportions **about philosophy** and its relation to human practices. If someone thinks there is **a** philosophical **theory** of morality whose uncritical adoption and mechanical application would suffice **to protect us from evil,** then that person is looking for something that **could never exist.** The correct standard for an ethical theory is whether it gets things right at the level of basic principles and values, not whether it contains some magical property that protects us, in the application of the theory, from every perversion or abuse through the influence of tradition and prejudice or the infinite human ingenuity of rationalization. **All theories are** about equally **subject to** such **abuse**, and no theory is immune to it. In fact, if we **[To] think** that the adoption of **a certain philosoph[y]**ical theory, or a certain set of religious dogmas, **will protect us from all** **moral error**, that way of thinking itself **is** extremely dangerous, quite irrespective of the content of the theory or dogma with which we associate it. That thought itself is actually **responsible for** a lot of **the evil** that **people do.**

#### Any theory can be misused – but that isn’t a problem with theorizing, that is a problem with us. We should reclaim the true function of these concepts in places like debate to challenge the way they are misunderstood. Your argument is only uniqueness for the educational value of mine.

#### And specifically, the categorical imperative’s emphasis on treating people as ends is key to challenge opression. FARR:[[7]](#footnote-7)

Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its emancipatory potential.

1. Laura Valentini, “Kant, Ripstein and the Circle of Freedom: a Critical Note,” European Journal of Philosophy

   Niko Kolodny. Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. *Recent Work on Political Coercion*. <http://sophos.berkeley.edu/kolodny/12FPhil290L3Ripstein1.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Property Rights: Exclusion as Moral Action in "The Battle of Texas"Author(s): Virginia AndersonSource: College English, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Mar., 2000), pp. 445-472Published by: National Council of Teachers of EnglishStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/378865 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. A SYMPOSIUM ON DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: THE MORAL AND PRACTICAL CASE FOR DRUG LEGALIZATION. SPRING, 1990 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 607 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Hope Lewis. “Women (Under)Development: The Relevance of “The Right to Development” To Poor Women of Color in the United States. Law & Policy, Vol. 18, Nos. 3&4, July/October 1996. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Kantian Ethics ALLEN W. WOOD Stanford University [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)